Should we start with the good news or the bad? As clouds of war once again gather over Tehran, senior officials in the region assessed this week the Iranian regime’s chances of survival as “very high.” If there is no genuine military intervention—said the officials, crossing their legs and leaning back—Khamenei could make it to January 20, 2029, the inauguration date of the 48th president of the United States, still ruling the Islamic Republic. It is extremely difficult to topple a regime that is prepared to kill even three hundred thousand of its own people if necessary, they explained.
Even if the regime were to fall, there is no reason to hope for a secular, liberal Iran. In their assessment, the regime that would arise would be a Persian version of Pakistan: a centralized, Muslim, hostile, and far-from-democratic system; the product of a “palace coup” within the Revolutionary Guards rather than a popular uprising from below, whose activists were mown down en masse in the streets. That is why there is not much enthusiasm in the region for an American attack—if, in their view, nothing good is going to come of it anyway.
And now for the good news: even if the regime does not fall, they believe the Iranian threat as we knew it no longer exists. The era in which Iran could calmly and without interference cultivate a formidable proxy army across the Middle East while inching step by step toward a nuclear bomb is over. They are “who they were,” and it is preferable to focus on eliminating the Houthis and the remnants of Hezbollah, the last remaining arms. The Middle East has already internalized the “day after” Iran; entirely different things now preoccupy it.
At the top of the list: Turkey. Within ten years, perhaps even less, the Sunni, terror-supporting regime in Ankara will try to take control of the Middle East. It too will have proxies, and it too will try to encircle Israel and make its life miserable. Senior officials in the region are not particularly troubled by Turkey’s and Qatar’s integration into Gaza’s “executive council,” which they see as largely symbolic. Qatar as well, in their view, is undergoing a slow process of turning in the right direction after years of a stormy romance with terror and incitement. But what will happen if Jordan—already a state with a Palestinian majority—falls into Turkey’s sphere of influence? What if Egypt falls? Or Lebanon? Attention must also be paid to the worrying processes underway in Syria and its effective transformation into Erdogan’s murderous client state. It is not yet too late to act, before the Muslim Brotherhood and their patron wash over the region.
This is an excerpt from my weekly column in Israel Hayom.
