The first tool used in Operation “Roaring Lion” was a used Hyundai i10—unwashed, scratched from parking. The Israeli deception operation before the strike included sending all the top IDF General Staff officers back home for Friday night dinner. After all, the neighbors watch the parking lot to see whether the general’s car is there; if it is, the attack must not be imminent. And so the head of the Planning Directorate, slipped away from the meal and made his way in his assistant’s second-hand car all the way to the command bunker.
It is already an open secret that Israel had planned a complementary operation against ballistic missiles around this coming June, marking a year since “Operation Rising Lion.” The new development was that the United States expressed interest in joining a campaign to bring down the regime. The Netanyahu–Trump meeting held at Mar-a-Lago on December 29 dealt mainly with finalizing a joint strike in the summer. Netanyahu returned from there, gathered a handful of senior officials and informed them.
That day will be remembered in history. By chance, just hours before the meeting in Florida, protests began in Tehran. At first they were too small for Netanyahu and Trump to take seriously. But a few days later it was decided to seize the opportunity, increase the stakes, move the attack forward and expand it significantly. The wheels of the dual war machine began turning quickly.
In fact, too quickly. Trump was very eager to deliver a crushing blow to the ayatollah regime. He therefore announced to the protesters that help was on the way. Israel had to restrain him and convince him—through the head of the Mossad—that such a premature strike would cause more harm than good. They succeeded, but then a new problem emerged: the president began to worry that the mission might be too big for Israel. It required another flight by Netanyahu to dispel those concerns, followed by an urgent meeting with IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir. He landed in freezing temperatures, carrying on his classified computer a fifty-slide presentation—the war plan.
In the United States there is order: instructions come from above and are implemented without a High Court and without the infamous left-wing NGO B’Tselem. Still, it helped that the commander of CENTCOM, Admiral Brad Cooper, is one of the U.S. military’s greatest experts on Israel. When Sinwar was eliminated, he opened a bottle of champagne to celebrate. After last June’s war he launched his own inquiry to understand the Israeli operation and what the Americans could improve. What began as theoretical study turned into operational preparation. The operation was originally meant to begin the previous Friday, but a combination of less-than-ideal weather and last-minute issues in the U.S. military caused a delay.
Back to the deception plan: the idea was simple and brilliant. For weeks Military Intelligence and the Air Force had been placed on full alert, aircraft loaded with bombs—wearing down Iranian vigilance. And precisely in the final days the readiness was lowered, supposedly, signaling that it would not happen now.
Saturday morning is a particularly opportune time for military surprises in the Middle East.
This is an excerpt from my weekly column in Israel Hayom.
