Benjamin Netanyahu’s preferred election date until now was September 8. It is the only Tuesday of the month that does not fall on a holiday (and holding elections on September 1, the opening day of the school year, is out of the question). That was until the ultra-Orthodox parties realized it meant voting four days before Rosh Hashanah. At least half a mandate would be in Uman, Ukraine on pilgrimage. Most of them are not expected to vote for Yair Golan.
So why not October? The conventional wisdom holds that Netanyahu has no interest in holding elections shortly after the third anniversary ceremony of the massacre, with reminders of the greatest failure looming just before voters head to the polls. But the original election date is October 27—three long weeks later. The ultra-Orthodox signaled that if the draft law passes, there is no problem holding elections on schedule. If not, they will probably still vote for the budget despite their threats, but will need to “punish” the government by advancing the dissolution of the Knesset, even if only symbolically. They were promised that the draft law would be the first passed in the term; now, at best, it will be the last.
Aside from Uman and Rosh Hashanah, the election will be decided by a group of roughly 300,000–400,000 people—Likud voters from 2022 who, according to some polls, have drifted to Bennett and Lieberman, but most of whom are still far from deciding how they will vote. They all subscribe, without exception, to four positions: first, that Netanyahu bears primary responsibility for October 7, and his evasion of this is ridiculous. Second, that Netanyahu bears primary responsibility for the achievements against Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria that followed, and it is doubtful anyone else could have delivered them. Third, that the ultra-Orthodox should be sent to the opposition and their young people to the army and the labor market. Fourth, that there is one coalition partner worse than all others—the Arab parties.
Not a single politician competing for their votes embraces all of these principles, hence the awkward and complex maneuvering by everyone. Bennett signaled this week the path he will try to thread through this needle’s eye: he promised not to sit with Arab party leader Mansour Abbas, tried to diminish Yair Golan as “the next energy minister—speaks from the gut but an October 7 hero, no worse than Deri,” and concluded with the promise: “I will steer.” Bennett’s task is complex, not least because he has already said that after the wholesale breaking of promises in 2021, he no longer promises anything—even to his children. But mainly because, according to the polls, his future coalition is far less popular than he himself is. Netanyahu can impose a vow of silence on his partners and faction members. Who can shut Yair Golan up?
This is an excerpt from my weekly column in Israel Hayom
