If Hezbollah was at level 100 on October 6, 2023, it reached the ceasefire on November 27, 2024 at roughly level 20. And its condition at the end of 2025? A slight improvement — somewhere around 25.
In the first two months after the war ended, Hezbollah was unable to staff platoon- and company-level command positions. The blow to its firepower capabilities was not only physical but systemic: the concept of dispersing and concealing the rocket and missile array collapsed. The same applies to the Radwan Force, which will not be able to storm northern communities due to the new buffer zone and the destruction of its bases in Shiite villages near the border.
The time since has therefore been used for rethinking. One conclusion is not to respond to Israeli strikes. In Israel this is interpreted as weakness on the part of an organization that for years deterred Israel and operated in Lebanon as if it owned the place. That is the truth — but not the whole truth. Hezbollah also refrains from responding because it understands that at the end of each week it is still stronger than it was the week before. So why give Israel a pretext for a broader attack?
Weakening Hezbollah is only one side of the equation. The other is strengthening the Lebanese state. Israel excels at doing its part, but it will never be able to eliminate the organization on its own. The reason for Lebanon’s weakness is Lebanese trauma. The Israeli “never again” is the Holocaust; the Lebanese equivalent, by contrast, is the civil war that destroyed the state. Hezbollah’s threat of war is deterrent enough. What threatens the Lebanese are Kalashnikovs, not rockets — and those the IDF cannot destroy.
So what is to be done? The story is also a race between bad money and good money. In the year since the ceasefire, despite efforts to block it, a billion dollars smuggled by Iran has nevertheless entered Lebanon, all of it devoted to rebuilding Hezbollah. And the good money? A quarter of a billion Western dollars has reached the country, but it is locked in a special fund that will be released only once anti-corruption conditions are met. At present, for example, the Lebanese army can operate only half its forces at any given time. Earning starvation wages of about $100, most soldiers work week-on, week-off — in the army and on side jobs — just to survive. Raise their salaries, and force strength would double overnight. If the United States and its regional allies want to close the story, they need to open their wallets.
